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In Ancis, the petitioner's real estate broker's license was revoked
because of a finding of untrustworthiness, and he sought review on the
grounds that the finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. The
court held that the finding was supported by substantial evidence of
untrustworthiness, but that the penalty suffered was too severe. Accordingly, the court reduced the penalty of revocation of petitioner's
license to suspension for three months, deeming the reduced penalty
to be "more appropriate."
The Ancis decision clearly illustrates the appellate division's authority under CPLR 7804(g) to dispose of all issues in the proceeding
before it on appeal or transfer. This procedure allows the petitioner
to obtain a review of all issues even though the application to the
court is based solely upon the grounds set forth in CPLR 7803.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL § 250: Presumption of domicile held not applicable to bilateral
Mexican divorce.
Section 250 of the DRL creates the presumption that a person who
resides within New York for prescribed periods before and after a
divorce action is commenced in a foreign jurisdiction, or who at all
times maintains a residence within the state, is a domiciliary of New
York when the action is commenced. The legislative intent of this
enactment is unknown," 4 but presumably its aim is to aid in the dissolution of foreign divorces on the theory that one domiciled in New
York can not be domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction. However, in
direct opposition to this presumption is the long established precedent
that a divorce decree of a sister-state may only be challenged on jurisdictional grounds when one party had insufficient opportunity to contest
the action." 5 This would therefore preclude section 250 from operating
on bilateral sister-state divorces. Such decrees must be given full faith
and credit by the state of marital domicile and can not be relitigated
in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected
by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion as to
the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed; or
4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held ... is, on the entire
record, supported by substantial evidence.
"14DRL section 250 was not included in the draft bill submitted by the Joint
Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Laws, hence there is no committee
report indicating the legislative intent. Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 18 SYRiCUsE L. REv. 157,
177 n.133 (1966).
115Paulsen, Divorce Jurisdiction By Consent of the Parties-Develapments Since
"Sherrer v. Sherrer", 26 IND. L.J. 380, 386 (1950-51). See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226

(1945).
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there.11 6 Unilateral divorces present a different problem. Only one
party has appeared in court, and the jurisdiction could not have been
contested. In such cases the question may be reopened and litigated in
the state where the marriage was domiciled. 117 The question to be considered with respect to unilateral divorces is by whose standards is
domicile to be judged? Will the New York presumption prevail over,
for example, Nevada's six-week residency requirement?118 If it does, is
New York giving the Nevada decree less than full faith and credit?
Such questions still remain unanswered.
Apparently section 250 would be most applicable to divorces obtained without the United States. In such an instance, New York is
not bound by full faith and credit to honor such decrees and comity
does not require recognition of them if they are contra to its public
policy." 9
In Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,120 a husband sought to annul his marriage on the grounds that his wife's prior Mexican divorce was invalid.
The Supreme Court, New York County, held that the Chihuahua,
Mexico, residence requirement' 2' was "a mere formality with no prerequisite that the party be in Mexico for any length of time or to state
any intention of becoming a resident,"'122 and that "by the Mexican
court's standards the question of domicile was irrelevant"; 1' therefore,
it remained to be adjudicated. The court refused to recognize the prior
Mexican divorce. On appeal, the appellate division reversed, 24 and
this decision in turn was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 125 both
courts expressing the opinion that to uphold the divorce would be
consonant with prior decisions and would not offend the public policy
of New York. It is presumed that one important consideration which
the Rosenstiel appellate courts took into account was the fact that to
affirm the supreme court's holding would have been to adversely effect
116 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 US. 226 (1945).
Nav. RLv. STAT. § 125.020()(e) (1967).
119 See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375, 130 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1955);
Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 149, 81 N.E2d 60, 62 (1948).
120 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.YS.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
117
118

121id. at 473, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 577:

Articles 22 and 24 of the Divorce Law of Chihuahua authorize the court to exercise
jurisdiction predicated upon the "residence" of at least one of the parties. "Residence," for the purpose of these articles is defined as personal registration with the
Municipal Clerk at the City Hall, the act of registration constituting a jurisdictional
act which is recited in a divorce decree.
122 Id. at 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
123 Id.

124 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.YS.2d 206 (Ist Dep't 1964).
125 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943
(1966).
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a substantial number of New York residents who had previously obtained foreign divorces 126 and who had subsequently remarried. To
have held otherwise would have rendered such remarriages bigamous,
intercourse adulterous, and any offspring illegitimate.
In Kakarapis v. Kakarapis, 27 the Family Court of Montgomery
County was recently called upon to decide whether or not section 250,
enacted almost two years after Rosenstiel, would have any bearing on
128
the theretofore consistent validation of Mexican bilateral divorces.
After signing a separation agreement in which his wife agreed to a flat,
single-support settlement, Mr. Kakarapis went to Chihuahua, Mexico,
signed the municipal register to meet the residence requirements, and
there obtained a final decree of divorce. Mrs. Kakarapis appeared in
this action through her attorney. The separation agreement was approved, ratified and incorporated into the judgment of divorce by
reference. 29 Mr. Kakarapis then returned to New York and resumed his
residence. Invoking section 250, his wife sought to have the divorce
declared null and void. In upholding the validity of the decree the
court relied upon Rosenstiel and did its best to push section 250 under
a carpet of rhetoric without weighing its effect or its utility. Confronted
with the apparent conflict between Rosenstiel and the statute, the
court stated:
Surely, this landmark decision affecting matrimonial jurisprudence was
well-known to the legislature when that section was enacted. Had New
York legislators sought to nullify the effect of the Rosenstiel decision
on foreign divorces, then certainly3 0 more decisive and comprehensive
language could have been chosen.
The problems in this holding are manifest. Must the legislature specifically identify a case it wishes to nullify? Is not the public policy of New
York reflected by the laws enacted by its elected representatives?' 31 If
Rosenstiel was based upon New York's public policy, hasn't the legislature declared what that public policy is by enacting section 250?
It would seem evident that the legislature intended to wage war
against the "quicky" foreign divorce by adopting the view expressed
in the Rosenstiel trial court. However, this attitude is wholly inconsistent with modem trends of thought and is contrary to the long line
126 As of 1964 it had been estimated that over two hundred thousand New Yorkers
had acquired Mexican divorces. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1964, at 34, col.. 2.
127 58 Misc. 2d 515, 296 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Fam. Ct. Montgomery County 1968).
128 See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 71, 209 N.E.2d 709, 716, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86, 88 (1965) and cases cited therein.
129 58 Misc. 2d at 516, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
180 Id. at 517, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
131 See Note, Divorce By Personal Jurisdiction of the Parties - A Support of the
Mexican Bi-Lateral Divorce, 29 ALBANY L. Rv. 328, 331 & n.39 (1965).
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of precedent which has recognized the validity of Mexican divorces on
the basis of comity. Moreover, Mexican divorces serve an important
socio-economic function and ought not to be dealt their death blow.
The same considerations which probably moved the Rosenstiel appellate courts, i.e., adultery, bigamy and illegitimacy, must still be considered when deciding whether or not section 250 will prevail, although
it may cogently be argued that since the enactment of the section, New
York domiciiaries have received fair warning of the possible consequences arising from failure to comply with its mandate, and therefore
it would not offend due process or "equity" to declare such a divorce
void.132 But when a marriage is finished in fact, it is, or should be,
finished at law as well. 3 3 Since divorce proceedings in New York are
cumbersome and the grounds for divorce are limited, the "quicky"
Mexican divorce often serves as the liberator of the unhappy and
troubled. It is quick, efficient and unhampered by the vestiges of Puritanism which so heavily pervade our present law. Unfortunately, the
Kakarapisopinion chose to ignore section 250 rather than confront the
issues which it presents by attempting to explain its applicability, if
any, to out-of-state divorces.
To deny validity to Mexican divorces through the use of section
250 will only serve to increase traffic to sister-state divorce havens since
they are presumably unscathed by the section under the aegis of the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Thus, out-of-state
divorces will not be prevented even if section 250 is held valid upon
review. It is hoped that future decisions will attempt to distinguish
Kakarapis and define the scope of section 250, or that the New York
legislature will take a serious look at the "presumption" which the
judiciary has declared presumes nothing.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS

Contempt: Right to trial by jury refused in criminal contempt proceedings against public employees union.
The New York Court of Appeals has decided that neither the
Taylor Law nor the equal protection clause of the United States Consti13 4
tution mandated a jury trial in Rankin v. Shanker.
132 Seigel, Conflict of Laws, 19 SYRAcuSE L. Rav. 235, 262-63 (1967).
It should be noted, however, that the question of the illegitimacy of the children born
from such a marriage (i.e., a marriage entered into after at least one of the parties thereto
has obtained a foreign divorce which the New York courts may subsequently declare
void) is no longer a valid consideration. New section 24 of the DR.L declares that a child
born out of such a marriage "is the legitimate child of both natural parents notwithstanding that such marriage is void or voidable or shall hereafter be annulled or judicially
declared void." DRL § 24, Laws of New York, 192 Sess. ch. 325 (1969).
133 See 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 32 at 21-22.
134 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1968).

